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Abstract
We examine the impact of state card-check legislation on public-sector union
membership. Based on an empirical analysis of data from 2000 to 2009, a time during
which eight states enacted card-check legislation for public employees, we find
significantly higher levels of public-sector union membership for states that passed
card-check legislation in years after the laws were enacted relative to states that did
not pass such laws. Moreover, average public-sector union membership increased for
the states that passed card-check legislation after the laws were passed relative to
their precard-check law union-membership levels.
Keywords
card check, public sector, union membership, union organizing, unions

Introduction
Since the passage of the first state collective-bargaining law in Wisconsin in 1959,
the legal environment for public-employee labor relations and public-sector unionism
has changed dramatically (Schneider 1988; Lund and Maranto 1996; Bennett and
Masters 2003). As of20 10, thirty-eight states granted union-organizing and collectivebargaining rights to at least some public-sector workers, and the union-membership
rate for public-sector workers was 37.4 percent compared to just 7.2 percent for private-industry workers (BLS 2010). In fact, for the first time in the nation's history, in
2009 public-sector union membership (7.9 million) eclipsed private-sector union
membership (7.4 million). Although several reasons for the divergent trends in publicand private-sector union membership have been explored elsewhere (e.g., Burton and
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Thomason [1988]; Thomason and Burton [2003]; Farber [2005]), we are interested in
examining the impact on public-sector union membership of recent changes to state
collective-bargaining laws that recognize card-check authorization as a means of
determining union representation.
Over the past ten years, sole reliance on certification elections has been increasingly debated, mostly as it relates to private-sector workers. Although the US Congress
has failed to pass legislation mandating card-check recognition for private-sector
workers, a number of states have adopted card-check laws either as part of their public-sector collective-bargaining laws, or by means of executive orders (Hoffman
2010). Despite some differences between the laws, in general they require an employer
to recognize a union if the union can show majority support from workers via employees' signatures on union authorization cards. As of 2009, twelve states mandate recognition via card check for at least some of their employees; eight of these states passed
card-check legislation since 2000 (Hoffman 2010).
In this article, we propose that laws mandating card-check authorization, because
they facilitate the union-organizing process, should lead to increases in public-sector
union membership. To examine the effects of the laws, along with other factors associated with public-sector union membership, we use pooled time series/cross-sectional
data on states from 2000 to 2009. The results indicate significantly higher levels of
union membership for states that passed card-check legislation in the years after the
laws were enacted relative to states that did not pass such laws. Moreover, we observe
notable increases in average union membership for the states that passed card-check
legislation after the laws were passed relative to their prelaw levels.

Eliminating Obstacles: Union Organizing
via Card-Check Authorization
According to Sachs (2010), labor law can be conceptualized in terms of legal default
rules. Specifically, labor policy can be understood as a legislative choice between having
a union or a nonunion default rule. The NLRA and public-sector collective-bargaining
laws in the states basically establish a nonunion default rule-that is, the default status
of workplaces is nonunion. Due to insurmountable practical and political obstacles associated with changing the default rule, labor advocates have focused on legislative
changes that would more easily allow workers to circumvent the rule, that is, legislation
that provides an "asymmetry-correcting rule." Card-check legislation accomplishes this
by facilitating the abilities of employees to unionize. Card-check authorization minimizes managements' participation in the union-organizing process, thereby removing
"certain impediments to the elicitation of workers' preferences" (Sachs 2010, 660-61),
making it easier for employees to take themselves out of the nonunion default rule without having to convince a legislature to alter the default rule.
Based on Sachs' model, one can easily predict how a card-check statute that mandates union recognition on the basis of authorization card signatures is likely to affect
unionization activity among public employees. First, the adoption of altering rules,
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such as card-check legislation, should impact labor unions' choices of organizing
methods. One would expect unions to gravitate toward "organizing technologies" that
facilitate the organizing process. Thus, the enactment of a card-check statute should
prompt public-sector unions to shift their organizing strategies toward the use of card
checks rather than elections. Second, Sachs' structural model suggests that in the
existing legal regime (i.e., a nonunion default rule, with no asymmetry-correcting
altering rule), workplaces where workers might prefer union representation might not
yet be organized. That is, in the absence of a union-representation default rule, and in
the absence of an altering rule that facilitates opting out of the nonunion default rule,
one would expect there to be workplaces where employees might prefer union representation, but where such representation has not been achieved-that is, workplaces
where there is a representation gap (Freeman and Rogers 1993; Finkin 2006). If this is
the case, the adoption of a card-check statute should enable unions to not only organize new workplaces, but also new types of workplaces. Consequently, card-check
statutes should facilitate union organizing and, thus, result in higher levels of union
membership.
In fact, prior research involving private-sector organizing outcomes in Canada and
the United States confirm the facilitating effects of card-check use on union organizing. Using data on private-sector certifications in British Columbia for years 1978
through 1998, Riddell (2004) examined how the change in British Columbia's labor
relations policy from card-check authorization (pre-1984) to certification elections
(1984-1993) and then back to card checks (post-1993) affected union-organizing
activity and outcomes. From 1984 to 1993, when certification elections were mandatory in British Columbia, certification attempts fell by around 50 percent (Riddell
2004). Moreover, the change to mandatory elections accounted for "virtually the entire
19 percentage point decline in private sector certification success rates that occurred
over the 1984 to 1992 period" (Riddell 2004, 509). The latter finding was largely due
to the greater effectiveness of management opposition to certification under the mandatory election regime.
Similar results were found by Eaton and Kriesky (2001), who examined approximately 132 organizing agreements involving private-sector employers and thirty-six
different national unions. They found that the percentage of organizing campaigns
resulting in certification elections was much higher under card-check agreements
compared to the typical NLRB election, and that agreements allowing union organizing via card check "cut almost in half the numbers of employers running anti-union
campaigns" (Eaton and Kriesky 2001, 50). Subsequent research by the same authors
further revealed that workers were much more likely to report pressure from management to oppose unions in NLRB elections than to report pressure from either coworkers or unions in card-check campaigns (Eaton and Kriesky 2009).
To be sure, the contexts examined in these studies differ from our focus on publicsector organizing outcomes under card-check regimes. Recent events in Wisconsin
and Ohio, among other states, notwithstanding, private-sector labor relations in the
United States have traditionally been more contentious than public-sector labor
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relations. Indeed, union success rates in public-sector representation elections have
been near 85 percent (e.g., Bronfenbrenner and Juravich [1995]; Gely and Chandler
[forthcoming]). Consequently, one might expect to see more dramatic differences in
certification outcomes and in the behaviors of unions and managements when moving
from elections to card checks in the private sector compared to the public sector. In
fact, Riddell (2004) found that the change from card checks to mandatory elections did
not negatively affect public-sector certification success rates in British Columbia, a
finding he attributes to the relative lack of public-sector employer opposition to
certification.
Card-Check Legislation in the American States: 2000-2009
For many, the use of card-check authorization represents a departure from the normal
method for achieving union recognition, namely the certification-election process.
The origins of this perspective date back to the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. Interestingly, however, during the early years of the NLRA, Boardsupervised elections were used primarily in situations where the employer questioned
the status of the union as the majority bargaining representative, while the card-check
process was the default-recognition method (Brudney 2005). In the mid-1940s, the
Board began showing a preference for elections as the primary means of union certification (Cudahy Packing, 12 NLRB 526, 1939). This practice was endorsed by Congress when the NLRA was amended in 1947 to require the Board to conduct a
representation election whenever "a question of representation" existed (29 U.S.C.A.
§ 159 (c)(1)(b)). Secret ballot elections then became the dominant method used to
certify a union as the exclusive bargaining representative of a group of employees.
The NLRA's approach to card-check organizing was largely incorporated by states'
legislatures when they enacted collective-bargaining laws for public employees. The
majority of state-level collective-bargaining laws provide for the certification of a
union based on the results of an election conducted by the appropriate state agency,
while allowing either explicitly or implicitly public employers to voluntarily recognize the union (Gely and Chandler forthcoming). For example, New Mexico's statute
allows a public employer and a labor organization "with a reasonable basis for claiming to represent a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit" to establish "an
alternative procedure for determining majority status" (N.M. Stat. § 10-7E-14(D)).
A few states, however, deviate from the NLRA approach. Since 1958, New York's
public-sector bargaining law mandates the corresponding administrative agency to
"ascertain the public employees' choice of employee organization as their representative
choice . . on the basis of dues deduction authorization or other evidence, or if necessary,
by conducting an election" (N.Y. Civ. Serv. § 207.2). More recently and relevant to our
study, eight states have since 2000 enacted public-sector labor legislation mandating
union recognition based on union authorization-card signatures for some employees
covered under their public-sector bargaining laws. Table 1 reports the states with cardcheck legislation, the year it was passed, and the type ofpublic employees covered under
the law. Despite some differences in coverage and the slightly different legislative
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Table I. Summary of State's Card-Check Laws (2000-2009)*
State

Year

North Dakota
California

May 2001
January 2002

Illinois

August 2003

California

January 2004

Oklahoma
New Jersey
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Oregon

April 2004
December 2004
December 2007
September 2007
September 2007

Scope
Applicable only to teachers.
Applicable to employees of any public agency,
including fire departments.
The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act
applies to employees of the state, political subdivisions of the state, and units of
local government.The Illinois Educational
Labor Relations Act applies to employees
of school districts, public community colleges, state colleges and universities, and
any state agency whose major function is
providing educational services.
Applicable to employees in K- 12 education,
secondary education, court interpreters,
and other trial employees.
Applicable
Applicable
Applicable
Applicable
Applicable

to
to
to
to
to

municipal employees.
most public employees.
most public employees.
most public employees.
most public employees.

*The New Hampshire law was repealed in June 201 1,without the signature of the Democratic governor,
after being approved by overwhelming majorities in the Republican controlled legislature.

language, the card-check laws that were enacted promote union organizing by allowing
unions to achieve recognition without a certification election, and do so in ways that
provide limited opportunities for employer interference.
As one might expect, six of the eight states that passed legislation allowing cardcheck authorization have duty to bargain legislation covering most major employee
groups (Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon). In
other words, even without the card-check legislation these states provided a very favorable legal environment for public-sector unions. The remaining two states vary in this
regard. California has meet-and-confer legislation for each ofthe major public-employee
groups, while North Dakota has a duty-to-bargain law only for public-school teachers.

Data and Analyses
We model public-sector union-membership levels within the states as a function of
three sets of variables-constituency-disposition variables representing state residents' ideological propensity toward union membership, such as state partisanship and
state ideology; contextual-demand variables that might relate to demand for union
representation; and variables representing the legal environment for public-sector
labor relations.
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Constituency-Disposition Variables
Public-sector union membership should reflect the receptiveness of a state's residents
to unions. We include measures of state ideology and state partisanship to capture citizen support for public-sector unions. Higher levels of liberalism and a higher proportion of state residents who are Democrats should be positively associated with
public-sector union membership. State ideology is the proportion of state residents
identified as liberal out of all liberals, moderates, and conservatives; and state partisanship is the proportion of state residents identified as Democrats out of all Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.'

Contextual-Demand Variables
Several contextual-demand variables are included in our analyses to control for their
effects on public-sector union membership. High unemployment reduces union collective bargaining power and union membership through job loss, but it may lead
unions to increase their organizing efforts, especially since public sympathy and support for workers increase during economic recessions. The average unemployment
rate, therefore, may be positively or negatively associated with public-sector union
membership. Racial minorities are more likely to face labor-market discrimination
and are found to benefit more from union membership than other groups. Thus, states
with large minority populations should have higher levels of public-sector union
membership. Prior research also suggests that because redistributive legislation is
more likely when prosperity is greatest, "affluent states therefore should be more
likely to enact provisions that help labor" (Jacobs and Dixon 2006, 124). Likewise,
union membership should be higher in more affluent states. We use per capita income
in the state as our measure of affluence.

Public-Sector Labor Relations Legal Environment
Labor's organizational strength should show a strong association with the comprehensiveness and strength of a state's public-sector labor legislation. In fact, prior research
finds that union membership increased dramatically in states that enacted legislation
protecting workers' right to unionize and engage in collective bargaining (e.g., Freeman and Valletta [1988]; Saltzman [1988]). To account for these effects, we include
two variables to represent state collective-bargaining laws. The bargaining laws are
categorized as either comprehensive, indicating that bargaining rights are granted to
nearly all occupations, or as narrow, indicating that there are no bargaining rights for
some occupations (Budd [2010] and citations contained therein) The occupational
groups in question are police and fire, state employees, public-school teachers, and
municipal employees. We include a variable equal to one for those states having comprehensive bargaining laws and zero otherwise; and a variable equal to one for those
states which have a narrow bargaining law and zero otherwise.2 To test for differences
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in union membership for card-check states and states that have not passed card-check
legislation, we include two variables-Precard Check equals 1 if the state does but had
not yet passed card-check legislation and zero otherwise, and Postcard Check equals
1 after a state passed card-check legislation and zero otherwise. By including both
variables in the analyses we can see if, relative to states that did not pass card-check
legislation, significant differences exist in union membership between noncard-check
states and card-check states pre- and postpassage of card-check legislation.
Finally, we also include control variables for state population, and time. The
variables used in the analyses are described, with means and standard deviations, in
Table 2. To test our hypotheses, we conduct a pooled time series cross sectional regression analysis using data from 2000 through 2009. Our basic research question is: What
is the effect of passing state card-check legislation on public-sector union membership
during the time period 2000-2009?
Results
Table 3 shows the results from the regression analyses. All models include variables
to control for time (2000 is the excluded category), 3 and a variable for state population. We begin the analyses by including the constituency-disposition, contextualdemand, and state-law variables into the equation separately to see how they relate to
public-sector union membership when not controlling for the other factors. These
results, which are shown in columns 1 through 3, provide initial support for most of
our hypotheses. As predicted, a higher percentage of state residents who identify
themselves as Democrats and a higher percentage of liberal voters in a state are both
positively and significantly associated with public-sector union membership (Model
1). Likewise, most of the contextual-demand variables significantly affect union
membership as predicted (Model 2). The average annual unemployment rate, per capita income, and government employment have significant, positive effects on membership. The one exception is the percent of minority employment which, contrary to
expectations, has significant, negative effects on union membership.
As for the effects of public-sector labor law (Model 3), the results show that the
presence of comprehensive duty-to-bargain legislation is positively and significantly
associated with union membership. However, the presence of narrow duty-to-bargain
legislation does not significantly affect union-membership levels relative to the
absence of public-sector labor legislation. In Model 4, we include two variables, Precard Check and Postcard Check, representing states that passed legislation at some
point during the 2000 to 2009 period. The coefficient for Precard Check shows the
difference in union membership between states that eventually passed card-check legislation and those that did not, prior to the passage of the legislation. Postcard Check
shows the difference in union membership between states having public-sector
card-check legislation and those that do not. When not controlling for other
factors, the results indicate that states that eventually passed card-check legislation
had significantly higher levels of union membership than other states, both pre- and
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Table 2. Variable Definitions
DependentVariable
Membership

Definition
The number of public-sector union members within the state.

p = 148,204.4, G = 229,535.9.
IndependentVariables
Comprehensive Duty to
Bargain
Narrow Duty Bargain
Precard Check

Postcard Check

A dummy variable equal to one if state has comprehensive bargaining laws for nearly all public employees. p = .52, G = .50.
A dummy variable equal to one if state has no bargaining rights
for some occupations. p = .30, G = .46.
A dummy variable equal to one if state passed card-check legislation covering some portion of the public-sector workforce
but the law has not yet been passed. p = .07, G = .25.
A dummy variable equal to one if state passed card-check legislation covering some portion of the public-sector workforce.

p = .09, G = .29.
State Ideology

Proportion of state residents identified as liberal out of all
liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Developed using
multilevel regression, imputation, and poststratification using
CBS/NYT polls with a three-year moving average (Pacheco

State Partisanship

Proportion of state residents identified as Democrat out of all
Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. Developed using
multilevel regression, imputation, and poststratification using
CBS/NYT polls with a three-year moving average (Pacheco

Unemployment
PCI

The average annual unemployment rate. p = 5.2, G = 1.7.
Per capita income (personal income/population, measured in

Percent Minority
Government Employment
Population
Year Dummies

Percent of labor force that is minority. p = 10.9,c = 1 1.4.
Total employment in government. p = 401447.4, G = 423582.4.

2011). p = .20, G = .04.

2011). p = .34, G = .06.

2000 dollars). p = 30036.9, G = 4798.3.

State population in thousands. p = 5882.1, G = 6473.0.
A series of dummy variables equal to one for each year
represented in the data (2000-2009; 2000 is the excluded
category).

Note: Unemployment data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://wwwbls.gov/laul
staadataa.pdf. Data for Population (2000-2007), Per Capita Income, and Government Employment were
obtained from the StatisticalAbstracts of the United States. Population data for 2008 and 2009 were obtained
from http://www.census.gov/popest/states/. Per Capita Income data were not available for 2009, so the
2008 data were used for that year Data for total employment and black employment (which were used to
calculate Percent Minority) were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; for states Arizona, Hawaii,
Idaho, Iowa, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah,Vermont, and Wyoming,
data on black employment were not reported so the percent nonwhite is used instead. Union data were
obtained from Hirsch, MacPherson, and Vroman (2001), and accompanying data online from http://www.
trinity.edu/bhirsch. Political partisanship and political ideology data were obtained from Pacheco; due to
missing data, 2006 data were used for 2007-2009.
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Table 3. Determinants of Public-Sector Union Membership in the American States, 20002009'

Postcard-Check

Model I
Coeff (SE)

Model 2
Coeff (SE)

Model 3
Coeff (SE)

Model 4
Coeff (SE)

Model 5
Coeff (SE)

92579
(18788)
53690(20545)

(12898)

79288
(14466)
1804.4
(16135)
1049850m
(161820)
232958(74867)
12067.
(3771 .20)
0.20
(1.18)
0.58(0.06)
-889.05m
(361.76)
85879(12934)

17566
(14018)
29.89(0.73)
-9I076(18217)
0.80500

30668.
(1 1943)
- I0.78-*
(4. I1)
-422600(41226)
0.87500

-

-

Explanatory
Variable

Precard-Check

State

Partisanship
Unemployment
PCI

-

Government
Employment
Percent
Minority
Comprehensive Duty to
Bargain
Narrow Duty
to Bargain
Population

-

Intercept
R-Square
N

-

-

1786877
(123579)
179144(77391)
-

-

State
Ideology

-

14786(4289.9)
9.88(1.07)
0.50m
(0.07)
- I337.5(407.59)
114867-

28.06.
(0.71)
-461374*
(37408)
0.83*500

-4.13
(4.68)
-345539(39135)
0.81l
500

29.5.
(0.81)
-32568(17044)
0.76500

aDummy variables for years 2001-2009 are included in all models; none were statistically significant.
Significance:* <.10 ** <.05 *** <.0 I (all tests are two-tail).

postpassage of their card-check laws.4 When all of the variables are included in the
analysis together (Model 5), the results from the earlier analyses are confirmed in most
cases, except for per capita income (PCI) and Precard Check, which become nonsignificant. The results indicate that prior to the passage of card-check legislation, there
is not a significant difference in public-sector union membership between states that
eventually passed card-check legislation and those that did not, controlling for other
factors that significantly influence union membership. However, after the passage of
card-check legislation, public-sector union membership is significantly higher in
states with the legislation compared to those without. Moreover, a comparison of the
regression coefficients, Precard Check and Postcard Check, reveals that union membership increased significantly in states after the passage of their card-check
legislation.
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In Table 4 we explore the individual trends in public-sector union membership
levels in those states that enacted card-check legislation. Table 4 shows union membership levels (and percent unionized) for each state for years 2000 through 2009. The
shaded numbers represent membership levels for years after the state's card-check law
was passed. Table 4 also shows the average numbers, pre- and postcard-check laws.
Although the limited numbers of observations pre- and postpassage of card-check
legislation prohibit us from discussing the results in terms of statistical significance, it
is clear from Table 4 that all states that passed card-check legislation experienced
increases in public-sector union membership after the state's card-check law was
passed. Moreover, all the states had increases in the average percent of public-sector
workers who were unionized. For comparison purposes, the average annual union
membership (percent unionized) for the forty-two states that did not pass card-check
legislation was 115,549.1 (31.0 percent unionized) for 2000 to 2004 and 120,782.36
(31.0 percent unionized) for 2005 to 2009. The forty-two states that did not pass cardcheck legislation experienced a 7.4 percent increase in total union membership from
2000 to 2009 (4,855,450 to 5,214,686). For the eight states that passed card-check
legislation, total union membership increased 19.2 percent (2,235,831 to 2,666,022).
In fact, total union membership increased by more in the eight states that passed cardcheck legislation than in the forty-two states that did not, and the card-check legislation was in effect for only part of the 2000 to 2009 period in those states.
Discussion and Conclusion
Most of the debate surrounding the adoption of card-check laws has revolved around
the normative issue of whether it is appropriate to facilitate the ability of unions to
organize new members. Those who believe that collective bargaining is bad public
policy argue that making it easier for unions to organize new members empowers
unions in ways that are ultimately detrimental to the public good (e.g., Stewart [2006];
Brudney [2005]). Those who support collective bargaining point to the many obstacles unions must overcome in organizing campaigns and argue that such legislation is
essential to ensuring employees' rights to achieve union representation (e.g., Friedman
[2007]; Brudney [2005]). Relative to the private sector, in the public sector this debate
acquires an added dimension because there has often been a somewhat visceral
response to the idea of making it easier for unions to organize public employees as
such efforts might be contrary to constitutional notions of free association.
Missing from this debate is a discussion of the positive issue of the effects of cardcheck laws on actual organizing activity and, ultimately, on union membership. This
article seeks to bridge that gap. Consistent with prior research on the determinants of
public-sector unionization rates, our results show that higher levels of union membership are associated with more liberal constituencies, and with the presence of bargaining statutes that are more union-friendly. More importantly, our results also show that
even after controlling for these other factors, the enactment of card-check legislation
is associated with higher levels of public-sector union membership. States that enacted
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card-check laws experienced increases in public-sector union membership compared
to other states.
The results thus indicate that card-check legislation matters. Our findings confirm
expectations regarding the potential impact of card-check legislation on union membership. In our current labor-law regime, nonunion representation is the default rule
and representation elections are the legally sanctioned approach for a union seeking to
be recognized as the employees' bargaining representative. Within this regime, the use
of card checks depends on voluntary agreement between the union seeking representation rights and the employer whose employees are the target of the organizing campaign. Given the historical opposition of employers to union representation (Dickens
1983; Raghunath 2008), employers are unlikely to acquiesce to a request for voluntary
recognition.
This concern about employer hostility has been traditionally associated with
private-sector employers, as the conventional wisdom has been that public-sector
employees face a more favorable organizing environment, largely due to the lack of
competitive pressures, a profit motive, or threat of bankruptcy for public-sector
employers (Gunderson 2005). Accordingly, public employers are generally considered less likely to aggressively oppose unions that are actively organizing public
employees (Craft 2003). In an environment characterized by reduced incentives for
employer opposition, one would expect public-sector unions to be less concerned
about facing a certification election, and therefore less eager to shift toward cardcheck organizing. Similarly, given that union density rates are higher in the public
sector, one would also expect there to be less pent-up demand for union representation
available for release after passage of a mandatory card-check law. Yet our results show
that even under these relatively favorable conditions, laws mandating card-check recognition facilitate union-membership growth.
Although our analyses predate these developments, recent events in states like
Ohio and Wisconsin, where legislation limiting the collective-bargaining rights of
public-sector employees has been enacted by Republican-controlled administrations,
highlight the significance of legislative developments and are relevant to our findings.
On the one hand, the aggressiveness with which governors Scott Walker in Wisconsin
and John Kasich in Ohio pursued antilabor legislation may prove to be a watershed
moment, akin to the 1980 PATCO's strike, marking a new willingness by public officials to aggressively oppose organizing efforts by their employees. If so, card-check
organizing should become a much more preferred method of organizing for publicemployee unions.
On the other hand, if public employers become more hostile toward public-sector
unions, it seems highly unlikely other states will adopt card-check legislation, leaving
public employees in a situation similar to that of their private-sector counterparts. In
fact, it is noteworthy that the New Hampshire legislature recently repealed the state's
2007 card-check law.' Perhaps similar actions will be taken in other states that recently
passed card-check laws.
Finally, we submit that our results are instructive with regard to the debate
surrounding enactment of the proposed card-check legislation for private-sector
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employees. Given the positive effects of card-check legislation on organizing activity
in the public sector, there should be even greater advantages to unions in the private
sector, where unions often confront vehement opposition by profit-minded managements. Private-sector unions should have strong incentives to pursue card-check organizing in order to avoid the aggressive employer opposition they often encounter in
election campaigns. Moreover, the relatively lower union-density rates in the private
sector may mean there are more ripe organizing targets for unions to pursue. In short,
mandatory card-check legislation for private-sector employees, if it were to ever pass,
may lead to significant increases in union-organizing activity and union growth.
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Notes
1. The state-ideology and state-partisanship measures we used for our analyses were created by Pacheco
(2011). Rather than using an aggregation approach to develop measures of state partisanship and state
ideology, Pacheco employs "multilevel modeling, imputation, and post-stratification (MRP) coupled
with a simple moving average to measure state public opinion over time" (Pacheco 2011, n.p.).
2. The excluded category includes states that have no bargaining legislation providing unionization and
collective-bargaining rights to public-sector employees, as well as two states that explicitly prohibit
collective bargaining.
3. Regression results with the year dummy variables, which are included to control for time, are not presented but are available upon request from the authors.
4. A comparison of the two regression coefficients (Precard Check and Postcard Check) also reveals an
increase in union-membership levels after the passage of a card-check law. However, the difference
between these two coefficients is not statistically significant.
5. Although not involving public-sector workers, Governor Brown's recent veto of a bill allowing California farm workers to organize via card check further suggests that enactment of card-check laws in other
states might become increasingly difficult.
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